I'm a fifth year PhD student in Finance at HEC Paris. My main research fields are corporate finance and banking.
I have a master's degree in economics from the Paris School of Economics and from Ecole Polytechnique/ENSAE.
I will be on the 2022 academic job market.
You can contact me at email@example.com.
You can download my resume here.
[New draft coming soon!]
with Aymeric Bellon (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania) and Louis-Marie Harpedanne (Banque de France)
This paper studies the resolution of disputes between firms and their lenders through external mediators, who suggest a non-legally binding solution to resolve a disagreement after communicating with all parties. We exploit an administrative database on firms' outcomes matched to the French credit registry and plausible exogenous variation in eligibility to public mediators across counties for identification. Credit, employment and investment increase following the mediation, causing an overall reduction in firms' liquidation of 34.6 percentage points. All the effects are driven by firms that borrow from more than one financial institution, supporting the view that mediators solve coordination problems between lenders.
Effect of the mediation on the probability of entering bankruptcy proceedings
with Anne-Laure Delatte (CNRS, CEPR) and Adrien Matray (Princeton University)
Formally independent private banks change their supply of credit to the corporate sector for the constituencies of contested political incumbents in order to improve their reelection prospects. In return, politicians grant such banks access to the profitable market for loans to local public entities among their constituencies. We examine French credit registry data for 2007-2017 and find that credit granted to the private sector increases by 9%-14% in the year during which a powerful incumbent faces a contested election. In line with politicians returning the favor, banks that grant more credit to private firms in election years gain market share in the local public entity debt market after the election is held. Thus we establish that, if politicians can control the allocation of rents, then formal independence does not ensure the private sector's effective independence from politically motivated distortions.
Spread of public entity bank loans over similar maturity T-bills
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